Introduction
Regulation has become the modality of choice for state activity in recent years, prompting claims that we live in the age of the 'regulatory state.' 1 These claims are based largely on the observation of the centrality of government regulation of business to modern governance arrangements and the displacement of governance modes associated with the welfare state such as public ownership, direct provision and integrated bureaucracies for policy making and operational tasks. More recently the growth industry in the regulation of public sector bodies by other parts of government has been identified, mapped and analysed. 2 This article provides an analytical framework for understanding a further, related trend, towards systematic oversight of government (akin to regulation) carried out by private (that is, non-state or non-governmental) actors. The role of private organisations -and in particular firms and NGOs -in modern governance has long been recognised, in particular in the public policy literature on networks. 3 However this literature has largely focused on policy making rather than implementation. 4 The literature on regulatory enforcement has analysed the interdependence of the private and public sectors in the implementation process. 5 However, systematic oversight by the private sector of public sector policy implementation has been substantially neglected both by public policy analysts and regulatory scholars and represents a significant lacuna in the literature. 6 Private regulation of the public sector is far from new. A variety of private families and companies have exercised controls over particular states at various times since the inception of the nation state. 7 More recently both firms and interest groups have exercised something akin to systematic oversight in respect of state activities ranging from the operation of economic policy through to policing. 8 In common with public regulation some of this private oversight is exercised over both public and private sector (by 'mixed economy' regulators -for example advertising and animal welfare), and some applies to the public sector alone (for example contracted-out public sector audit). Not all private oversight is intended to form a regulatory regime, but where it has regulatory effects it properly belongs within the set. An example of a regime which has the effect but not the object of regulating is the activities of credit rating agencies in assessing the appropriate rating for sovereign credit. Private regulators, though they may be lacking in formal power, are more likely than public regulators to operate 'complete' regimes (in the sense that they may set standards, monitor for compliance and carry out enforcement without the need for intervention from others such as government departments and courts). Put simply there is a tendency for some private regulators to be able to act more autonomously than would be true of public regulators.
This article sets out the case for the identification of a set of private regulators of the public sector and offers a means for classifying them based on the concept of legal mandates. Thus it offers an analysis and description of the range of forms which such private regulation takes in the United Kingdom. The concluding section examines the implications of the analysis both for the way we understand governance and regulation and for normative theories concerned with the control and accountability of governance institutions.
The Public and the Private
The key distinction underlying the analysis in this paper is that between the public and suggests that the logic of the functional approach is not fully applied. In particular, it appears to be reserved for questions about amenability to judicial review and not to wider questions of institutional design within which private actors fulfil significant public roles.
Examination of statutory enactments under which the trigger for application is the 'publicness' of an organisation reveals no clear approach. Thus the functional approach is reflected in the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, which are to apply to acts of 'public authorities', defined as 'any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature'. 10 Conversely the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which applies openness rules to public bodies, operates by means of an exhaustive list of organisations to which the Act applies and generally uses an ownership approach. 11 If the functional analysis were followed through, we might expect private regulators exercising public functions to be treated as public for all purposes (rather than the more limited purposes of judicial review and human rights).
Private regulation of the public sector is distinctive in a number of ways. First, in contrast with private sector participation in policy making, there is a tendency towards the exercise of private regulatory functions within discrete, free-standing regulatory organisations. Second, and in contrast with public regulatory activity, the capacity to exercise regulatory power is not necessarily linked to the holding of a legal mandate. A further contrast with public regulatory activity is that there is a tendency for private regulators to take responsibility for all three elements of a regulatory regime: standardsetting, monitoring and application of sanctions, where it is more common (at least in 
Oversight
Earlier research on public oversight of the public sectors has defined 'regulation inside government' as systematic arms-length control of one public sector organisation by another with some element of official mandate. 16 To have an effective regulatory regime there must be a standard setting element and monitoring and enforcement. 19 It has been argued that the success of organized crime in some parts of Japanese society arises from the capacity of criminals to deliver institutions of property rights enforcement and protection services which forms with greater capacity for hierarchical control among those regulators with formal authority, derived either from statute or contract, as discussed below.
Authority and Mandates
It is immediately apparent that private overseers are not all of one type. They are all privately owned. They all exercise some form of systematic arms-length oversight over some part of the public sector. The chief purpose of seeking to classify the army of private regulators is to define the whole set so as to prove a reasonably exhaustive analysis of the issues raised by the different forms which private regulation takes. The central dimension in which there is variety is in the nature of the mandate ( 41. An appropriate response in these circumstances is for the state to improve the quality of the civil and criminal justice systems and attempt to control the problem of organized crime through competition rather than the exercise of hierarchical authority. In a different context the Protection and Indemnity Clubs which provide mutually based marine insurance are said to be in competition with EC competition authorities over the environmental regulation of shipping firms which is based on principles of mutuality antithetical to EC competition law rules:P. Bennett, Paul, (2000) 
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The third class of private overseer is the organisation which has no legally binding mandate derived from statute or contract. Though there is no legal mandate, conventionally understood this group may nevertheless have power to seek behavioural modifications from public sector bodies. This power is neither voluntary nor coercive.
The main resources relevant to the holding of governance power generally are authority, information, organisation and wealth. 35 For those who lack formal authority, power is derived from having the wealth to bring public interest litigation, either in public or private law, the possession of information and the resources to disseminate it, and the 34 H. Collins Regulating Contracts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) discusses the reverse issue, of government using contract as a regulatory instrument over the private sector -311-315. An instance of the phenomenon I am discussing might theoretically arise in one of the sectors where public bodies remain important suppliers of services as with the postal sector and possibly the reconstituted rail infrastructure company which will emerge from the collapse of Railtrack plc. 35 C.Hood The Tools of Government (London, Macmillan, 1983) 4-6 refers to these four basic resources of government as 'nodality' ('the property of being in the middle of an information or social network'),'treasure', 'authority' and 'organisation'. I have not only adapted his terms but also suggest that they are the resources of governance more generally (that is applying beyond governmental actors).
capacity to deploy organisational resources, for example in the form of direct action (such as boycotts and physical blockades).
Public interest litigation and the threat of litigation are widely deployed by pressure groups as a means to enforce or develop standards on public sector bodies. Examples of such judicial rule making abound in connection with prisons, social security and housing. 36 The capacity of pressure groups to use litigation as part of their overall strategies, for example to raise prison standards, is dependent upon judicial interpretation of rules relating to standing to sue and rights of intervention in actions commenced by others. With prison rules pressure groups are able to cite standards of humanity which command widespread support (though they may vary in interpretation). In other domains, such as social security, where there is less consensus over appropriate standards, litigation is more problematic since victory at law can be reversed by legislation.
Accordingly Prosser concluded that in the social security domain a valuable role for the courts was for setting process standards for decision making. In other instances though a legal action might be unsuccessful it could be a prelude to political campaigning. 37 We may speculate that the modest liberalisation of these rules engineered by the Administrative Court will give to pressure groups greater capacity to use litigation in support of their overall objectives. Loosening of the rules on standing appears to displace restrictive rules under which only those affected by administrative decisions could apply for judicial review and creates a greater possibility that the Administrative Court be used for a 'generic enforcement function'. 38 There has also been a greater willingness of the courts to permit interest groups to intervene as third parties to actions. developments we might expect judicial review to be used more widely in support of interest groups' objectives in controlling public sector actors. It has been argued that if
English law is to develop a principle of 'citizen standing' then its application should be reserved to cases involving 'the most important of the public's interests'. 39 An example of information-based regulation is the systematic oversight of the finances of public and private organisations by credit ratings agencies. Here the main instrument of control is the publication of information. This process has been most important, in the terms of this article, in the development by the four main international ratings agencies of ratings for 'sovereign credit'. Factors affecting the assessment are liable to include the stability of government arrangements and the independence of the judiciary, in addition to perceptions of the prudence or otherwise of fiscal policies. Agencies aim to provide a gradation between highly speculative to extremely safe credit. 40 Ratings agencies derive their power from trust in the information which they produce. They have been characterised as 'global mediating organizations'. 41 The Southeast Asian economic crisis of 1997 has been partly attributed to excessive trust in those ratings agencies which were too sanguine about the economic stability of nations such as Thailand.
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Where the media maintains effective systematic oversight (as with some investigative journalism -for example systematic scrutiny of local corruption by local journalists) then it may come within this third class of mandateless regulators. Certainly the media exerts considerable information power in contemporary society. 43 However the capacity of newspapers to carry out such systematic investigation is limited. with the general day-to-day cycle of media activity. 44 A contemporaraneous account of the Watergate Affair suggests that only a handful of newspapers would have had the resources to carry out the investigation necessary to make a significant impact on the story and, of those, only one, the Washington Post, chose to devote only the time of two relatively junior journalists to the task. 45 A further reason that news and other media editors might not pursue investigative journalism is the risk associated with liability for defamation -either that the chilling effect of a threat of a defamation action may prevent a story being run, or the actual costs of defending an action subsequently. 46 A UK empirical study found that these considerations were likely to inhibit local and regional press more than national news media, and in turn those national media which employed their own in-house lawyers were likely to show less caution than those who relied on outside advice. 47 Examples of the deployment of organisational resources are provided by the efforts of Greenpeace use litigation, information dissemination and direct action in concert.
Setting Standards
The values which private regulation of the public sector promotes are diverse and include efficiency, greenness, security and humanity. The public-private interface in the making of the applicable standards takes at least three forms : publicly-set standards; privately-set standards; public and private standards in competition.
In some regimes the applicable standards are set publicly but monitoring and perhaps enforcement are the responsibility of private regulators. For efficiency, an example of such a public/private mix is provided by contracted-out public audit. For humanity, the private monitoring and enforcement of public rules against cruelty to animals provides an example. Such publicly-set standards tend to be monopolistic in character, although that tendency may be mitigated to some extent by diffuse monitoring and enforcement practices as with public audit. Those private regulators who never use litigation as a mechanism of formal enforcement are clearly not restricted to the application of official standards. An example is provided by the activities of credit rating agencies in providing ratings for sovereign debt. The ratings agencies are free to set their own standards and criteria by which to assess the credit-worthiness of national governments and to decide whether or not to make these standards public. Equally, international NGOs such as Transparency International and Greenpeace International are free to set their own standards and criteria by which to assess the conduct of national governments.
Monitoring and Enforcement
Research on public regulators of the public and private sectors reveals a wide variety of mechanisms for asserting control. In many cases formal enforcement actions -the application of civil or criminal penalties and revocations of authorisations -sit towards the apex of a pyramid in which lower level strategies of education, advice and warnings are routinely deployed to secure compliance. 52 Some regulators of the public sector, such as prisons and schools inspectorates, lack the power to apply formal sanctions and are dependent on public or private censure or on informing others who do have formal powers to act. 53 A similar picture of variability in powers to enforce emerges with private regulation of the public sector.
As with regulation generally, we should not assume that hierarchical control is the only mechanism by which controls over public sector activities can be exercised. A central element of recent public sector reform activity has been to subject public sector actors to the private controls of the market. In a significant proportion of its market the publicly owned Post Office is in competition with private postal and parcel companies. However, the extent of control through the market should not be overstated as in many sectors
where there appears to be public/private competition (such as health and education) it is frequently the case that the private sector is providing a different product. This product differentiation occurs in the postal sector too. A key example of information as the basis for control is the regular publication by
Transparency International (TI) of its Corruption Perceptions Index, which uses a league table format to criticise countries with a reputation for being corrupt. 59 TI combines this publication with a strategy of working with civil society organisations in particular countries to build the societal 'pillars' which aim to squeeze corruption out of government systems. Where the private overseer has good information and that information has salience in the media we might expect the threat of publication to be capable of grounding lower level strategies of education and advice. However, not all private overseers will see this as part of their function. Credit rating agencies do not seek compliance with any particular set of norms, but rather seek to describe the risks associated with any particular borrower. Thus for such agencies publication of information is the only strategy -and a very powerful one. The significance of the ratings offered by the agencies is that the better the rating (that is the lower the risk identified) the easier it is for borrowers to borrow and the more favourable are the interest rates.
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Thus the effect is to public bodies incentives to minimise the general risks associated with their operations that are relevant to their capacity to repay debt.
Conclusions
The concept of private regulation of the public sector set out in this article encompasses a wide range of processes governing diffuse public organisations and activities. Common 
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The two forms of private regulation of the public sector which have the greater novelty (at least in exposition) are those involving individuated contractual power and those which do not derive from a legal mandate. Clothed in the form of commercial contracts contractual regulation of the public sector is remarkably hidden, to the extent that there is virtually no literature on the phenomenon. This group of private regulators together with some members of the group with no formal mandate are striking for the extent to which they wield regulatory power over the public sector outside normal modes of control and accountability. A central hypothesis emerging from the analysis is that regulatory power does not need the backing of statutory authority to be effective and important. This hypothesis could be tested both in the domain of private regulation and more generally.
These observations raise a number of normative questions. Any dependence on private regulation within the wider architecture of contemporary governance must recognise important limits to private regulatory capacities. Many private regulators lack the clout they would have if they were public agencies and if that leads to weakness in fulfilling public mandates then they may need to be enhanced (for example by changing rules which inhibit investigative journalism or the capacity of NGOs to pursue litigation).
Conversely some non-statutory private regulators operate complete regimes in the sense of having the capacity to set standards, to monitor and enforce without the intervention of other organisations. Where this is the case they wield more power than those public regulators which are constrained by the need to follow standards set by legislatures or government departments and to pursue litigation in order to apply legal sanctions. There is thus a remarkable concentration of private power over public organisations. This is perhaps most striking with those private regulators operating internationally whose judgements on such matters as financial or fiscal credibility, probity or greenness significantly affect decisions of notionally democratic governments. This question is particularly pertinent when applied to international private overseers which have the capacity to provide a counter-balance both to democratic and undemocratic government.
Credit agencies and NGOs exemplify the 'private, oligarchic forms' which are said to dominate contemporary, globalized governance structures. 62 To identify substantial power is not to argue that private regulators should necessarily be subject to similar control and accountability mechanisms as those which apply to public regulators. It is both a strength and a weakness of private organisations that they are subject to different forms of control from the public sector. On one account the effective delegation of public functions to private bodies magnifies a problem of accountability which already existed with agencies. 63 But arguably the relative independence which private regulators have from government could insulate them to a greater degree from the political intervention which has tended to bedevil notionally independent public agencies.
An alternative response is to undertake more detailed analysis of particular regimes than has been attempted here with a view to identifying the range of mechanisms through which particular private regulators are held in check or made to answer for their activities. Some regulators, such as those carrying out contracted out audits and inspections, are subject to direct oversight by public bodies. Private regulators can be more tightly embedded within public regimes, as happened in 1988 with the Advertising Standards Authority whose enforcement powers were linked to the new injunctive powers of the Office of Fair Trading. 64 Others, such as professional associations 65 and non-governmental organisations, may be strongly embedded within a wider community which offers a legitimate alternative to control through democratic government channels. Such experience could be developed to build communities of private overseers to share best practice and act as mutual checks on one another (as happens within the mixed public/private British and Irish Ombudsmans' Association).
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A third group, such as financial and accreditation institutions, may effectively operate within a market within which the quality of their judgements is assessed and may lead to diminished loyalty where they prove defective. 67 However the viability or appropriateness of competition may depend on the sophistication of the 'consumers' of the information. 68 Accordingly we might be most concerned about those private regulators which operate monopolistically within their domains and in a fashion which is detached from wider communities. Where private regulators are setting standards at odds with democratic values (for example insurers more risk averse than public sector bodies, prisons reformers more humane than Parliament) a possible response is to build democratic representation into private regimes. This is a reverse take on the classic proceduralisation prescription which seeks to build civil society into public decision making. 69 An alternative possibility is to think of a reverse form of 'co-regulation' within which the regime of private regulation stimulates public involvement in such matters as setting standards or enforcement priorities
An important counter to international private power generally is the formation of networks of governments and regulatory authorities, often organised around particular scientific and technical areas. 70 Arguably this tendency represents an application of the law of requisite variety, seeking to meet the challenges of private networks of power through the development of equivalent or interdependent governmental communities. But in the delicate equilibria which arise from such arrangements it is often none too clear who is in charge. Incentives may lie in opposite directions. For example, a few months after Ireland was censured by the European Council for breach of European guidelines relating to fiscal policy in a national budget 71 the private rating agency, Standard and Poor's, raised Ireland's long term sovereign credit rating to AAA. 72 Private regulation of the public sector deserves to be recognised as a significant and growing constraint on governmental activities both nationally. The phenomenon presents both new possibilities for reviewing and checking the exercise of public power and old problems of controlling and accounting for the exercise of power in new forms. It requires further analysis to understand the conditions under which private regulators are most potent and effective and to examine whether the constraints which apply to private regulators within particular domains are adequate or need reconfiguration.
